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The spectacular collapse of the United States financial system in the fall of 2008 and 
severity of the subsequent recession were practically unforeseen by almost all market 
participants.  Such a crash came as a surprise not only to laymen, but also to financial 
professionals and governmental officials charged with enacting regulation designed to 
prevent such scenarios.  Unprecedented actions were taken by the Federal Reserve both 
to halt a complete collapse of crucial financial markets, and to ensure that at least some 
credit remained available to worthy borrowers.  These actions were necessary to 
overcome the sudden reluctance of financial institutions to take any risks in an 
environment of such uncertainty.  While the crash was unforeseen, it was simply the 
latest in a long series of financial crises dating ultimately to the foundation of a financial 
system within an economy—notable recent historical precedents include the stock market 
crash of 1929, Japan’s real estate bubble in the 1980s, and the collapse of the NASDAQ 
stocks in 2001. 
 
The dramatic nature of this crash brought renewed attention to the theories of a 
previously little-regarded economist known as Hyman Minsky.  Disregarded during his 
lifetime for espousing unpopular views regarding the potential dangers of unchecked 
markets, Minsky produced work concerning the inherent instability of an economy with a 
thoroughly developed and complex financial system.  Following the most recent 
spectacular crash, his ideas were suddenly revisited as a potential explanation for the 
reoccurrence of a type of crisis many had thought extinct. 
 
Minsky developed a Financial Instability Hypothesis which sought to find an endogenous 
explanation for a modern economy’s vulnerability to crashes.  Specifically, he 
investigated the ways in which the financial structures of a modern economy might 
contribute to its instability.  The hypothesis rests upon the twin assertions that some 
financial arrangements are more dangerous than others, and that during economic booms, 
investors’ incentives are altered to favor these more dangerous arrangements.  
Essentially, in good times, the profit-seeking motive of investors overrides a diminished 
risk aversion, as memories of losses fade into the past. 
 
This paper empirically tests Minsky’s second assertion, by using econometric techniques 
to analyze the relationship between risk appetite and market returns.  Spreads between the 
yields of bonds of different credit qualities are used as a proxy for wider investor 
sentiment toward risk.  Regressions demonstrate that changes in risk appetite can be 
explained at least in part by historical market returns. 
 
Such a finding supports Minsky’s proposal that incentives of investors change in 
response to varying market conditions.  It further implies that regulatory authorities might 
examine the level of risk appetite to determine whether increases in asset prices indicate 
the formation of speculative bubbles or are rather reflecting developments in the 





2.1 Role of Markets within an Economy 
 
The rise of efficient capital markets has proven to be a crucial component in the evolution 
of what might be considered a modern economy.  These ‘modern economies’ found 
within developed nations depend largely upon the smooth operations of their financial 
markets: these markets play an extremely important role in the fundamental task of 
providing financing to firms who seek to engage in investment projects.  Few economists 
seriously question the pivotal role that financial institutions and the primary capital 
markets have to play in the process of efficiently allocating the resource in question 
(money, or credit) from savers to borrowers, or that the efficient facilitation of such 
lending is a component essential to maximizing the efficiency and level of economic 
growth. 
 
The distinction between primary and secondary markets however, is an important one, 
and many economists might argue that secondary markets have little if anything to add in 
the way of economic value to an economy.   
 
2.2 Primary Markets 
 
Primary markets generate funds for those firms and governments seeking to borrow in 
order to finance projects that require spending, thus allowing the borrowing firms to 
engage in profitable enterprises which they might otherwise be unable to pursue.  
Generally speaking, within the context of a primary market, firms issue financial 
securities (i.e. stocks or bonds) for a previously agreed-upon price.  The price is set by 
the issuing firm and any financial intermediaries, i.e. investment banks, that agree to 
underwrite the securities issuance.  The underwriting investment banks seek to accurately 
determine the market appetite for such a security and price it accordingly.  For example, a 
well-capitalized firm with excellent prospects for both growth and profit, such as Google 
Inc., would likely experience high demand for securities it might issue.  It would thus be 
able to issue bonds with a lower coupon rate—essentially allowing it to borrow money 
more cheaply.  Conversely, a company with a less healthy balance sheet and only 
speculative prospects might not fare as well within the primary markets, and would be 
forced to pay higher coupons on any debt it would issue.  The market, made up of 
individual investors, would thus be demanding a higher interest rate on credit it was 
willing to extend the second company, precisely as a bank or credit card company would 
choose to charge higher rates on loans to a customer with a poor credit history.1 
                                                         1 An excellent example of this phenomenon can be viewed in the recent and ongoing Greek debt crisis.  
Because market participants doubt the Greek government’s ability to cut its fiscal deficit and spur 
economic growth, Greece finds itself unable to borrow except at increasingly higher rates.  The issue is 
deteriorating exponentially as the rates reach levels that suggest Greece’s debt growth will outpace its GDP 
growth, and consequently ability to repay its debt. 
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2.3 Secondary Markets 
 
Secondary markets, so-called because they follow temporally the action of the primary 
markets, are those in which previously issued securities are bought and sold by investors 
without the involvement of the issuing firm.  Because the firms and governments whose 
debt is being dealt have no part in these transactions, the secondary markets do not offer 
such a direct benefit to the issuers of the securities as the primary markets.  However, 
operational and efficient secondary markets play an indirect role in supporting the 
function of primary markets.  As secondary markets allow holders of securities purchased 
in primary markets the ability to sell said securities, their existence greatly increases the 
liquidity of securities issued within the primary markets.  This liquidity in turn increases 
the desirability of such instruments to investors, and consequently investors are willing to 
pay a greater price for the same security, all else being equal: i.e. they do not charge the 
borrowers a liquidity premium that they likely otherwise would.  Hence, secondary 
markets contribute significantly, if indirectly, to general economic efficiency by greatly 
reducing the borrowing costs of firms issuing debt within primary markets. 
 
The existence of secondary markets also significantly benefits the investors, or savers 
within an economy.  Because participation in a primary issuance is usually limited, at 
least in practice, to those who have significant experience operating in financial markets 
and a good relationship with the underwriting institution, secondary markets allow other 
investors to invest in securities which they might not otherwise be able to purchase. 
 
Finally, secondary markets benefit firms and governments by allowing them a measure 
by which to gauge investor sentiment and appetite.  This information is indispensible in 
the pricing of new debt issues and can give a firm an idea of how its credit-worthiness as 
a borrower is viewed in the eyes of market participants.  For example, a firm that wishes 
to issue new debt and already has bonds available in the marketplace might use the 
current yields on the outstanding bonds to help determine the pricing of the new issue: 
i.e. if the outstanding bonds are being bought and sold at a significant discount to their 
face value in the secondary market, their yield to maturity would be higher than the 
coupon rate with which they were originally issued2, and this ‘market-rate’ would have to 
be considered as the basis for determining the pricing of any new issue. 
 
2.4 Market Vulnerability 
 
However, despite the important role that primary and secondary markets play in a healthy 
economy by allowing firms and governments access to efficient financing, lack of 
appropriate regulation can lead to abusive practices within markets.  Such practices can 
unfortunately generate situations where markets are capable of wreaking real damage 
upon an economy.  As the functioning of capital markets is vital to the success of a 
healthy modern economy, any disturbance to the operation of such a market is likewise 
damaging to the economy as a whole.                                                         2 A bond’s yield to maturity is calculated as the sum of the present values of all future cash flows divided 
by the price of the instrument.  Consequently a bond’s yield is inversely related to its price. 
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However, serious difficulties within financial markets are capable of causing damage to 
the economy beyond the destruction of their own function.  A sudden market crash such 
as that of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929 can contribute to an economic downturn 
by causing panic, rapidly eviscerating paper wealth, and deeply damaging the confidence 





Damaging market ‘resets’ or crashes, such as the incident of 1929, generally only occur 
after a period of extended buildup in market prices not based upon fundamental changes 
underlying those assets.  Economists often refer to such peculiar growths in asset prices 
as ‘bubbles’.  The name is an apt metaphor and provides some basic insight into the 
behavior of bubbles; just as physical bubbles, after being carefully and slowly blown up, 
are extremely delicate and prone to bursting, market ‘bubbles’, though their creation 
requires a significant length of time and positive market sentiments, can be destroyed 
entirely in a matter of days or even hours as a single piece of news can induce a 
widespread selling panic.  An initial wave of selling lowers prices by flooding the 
marketplace with excess supply.  That drop in prices can prompt flighty investors to 
fearfully sell their own stakes before prices fall further—adding more supply to the 
marketplace and lowering prices further.  This sort of psychological feedback process can 
get quickly out of hand, and is the mechanism by which markets crash. 
 
Fig. 2A 
3                                                         3 Source: Author’s calculations.  Earnings are average of 10 years lagging earnings in real terms. Data 
source: Robert Shiller 
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The above figure graphs the Price/Earnings ratio for Standard and Poor’s Composite 
Index in real dollars for the years 1980-2002 against its average historical value since 
1881 (16.35).  As the Price/Earnings ratio can reasonably be understood as a measure of 
the value of an equity share, this graph illustrates that stock shares were considerably 
overpriced with respect to historical norms during the years of 1997 to 2001.  The shape 
of this chart is typical for bubbles in any market or asset—a generally steady increase in 
price that quickens in pace until it reaches dizzying heights is followed by an abrupt 




The rapid buildup in asset prices that are already increasing in value is generally ascribed 
to the investment practice known as speculation: 
 
Speculation is conventionally defined as an attempt to profit from changes 
in market price.  Thus, forgoing current income for a prospective capital 
gain is deemed speculative.  Speculation is active while investment is 
generally passive.  According to the Austrian economist J. A. Schumpeter, 
“the difference between a speculator and an investor can be defined by the 
presence or absence of the intention to ‘trade,’ i.e. realize profits from 
fluctuations in security prices.”4 
 
A speculator is thus understood to be a participant in an asset market who seeks to profit 
from capital gains in the asset: i.e. a speculator buys a security specifically with the 
intention of reselling it at a higher price in the future.   
 
This approach to securities purchases might be contrasted with that of an investor who 
might purchase financial securities for the cash flows that they will generate in the future, 
with less emphasis on the price of the security itself.  A speculator conversely is 
interested in a security not for its underlying cash flows, but rather for its ability to be 
‘flipped’ to another market participant at a higher price, and thus a profit.  As a speculator 
is less interested in the fundamentals of an asset than in how quickly its price might rise, 
his actions might be compared to those of a gambler simply betting that the price of a 
certain asset will increase.  Indeed, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish clearly 
between the actions of a speculator and a gambler—the only clear difference is that one 
deals in financial assets where the other deals in horse racing. 
 
Speculation on the individual scale is of little consequence to the prices of an asset or the 
market in which it is bought or sold.  However, speculation as a practice can present a 
real danger to economies thanks to positive feedback mechanisms that can enable it to get 
out of control.  Literature on the topic describes these mass-psychological movements 
within markets as ‘manias’, or ‘euphorias’.  During one instance within the United States 
equity markets, the mass psychology of market participants was famously referred to by                                                         4 Edward Chancellor. Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, New York: 1999), p. xi. 
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former Chairman of the Board of Directors of the United States Federal Reserve Bank 
Alan Greenspan as an “irrational exuberance”.5 
 
Such widespread irrational euphoria in the mass psychology of the market can only come 
about as the result of positive feedback cycles: 
 
In feedback loop theory, initial price increases…lead to more price 
increases as the effects of the initial price increases feed back into yet 
higher prices through increased investor demand. This second round of 
price increases feeds back again into a third round, and then into a fourth, 
and so on. Thus the initial impact of the precipitating factors is amplified 
into much larger price increases than the factors themselves would have 
suggested.6 
 
In this manner, price increases in an asset due to other, fundamental, factors can become 
the cause of further price increases by ramping up demand for said asset in a competitive 
marketplace with limited supply.  This cycle can theoretically feed upon itself 
indefinitely, and often does for periods of great duration, propelled by speculators who 
are incentivized to keep buying as long as prices are increasing: 
 
During these euphoric periods an increasing number of investors seek 
short-term capital gains from the increases in the prices of real estate and 
of stocks rather than from the investment income based on the productive 
use of these assets.  Individuals make down payments on condo 
apartments in the preconstruction phase of the developments in the 
anticipation that they will be able to sell these apartments at handsome 
profits when the buildings have been completed.7 
 
Speculation in markets is thus seen both to spur and be spurred by increases in market 
prices that may initially have had a fundamental backing.  Through this type of feedback, 
speculation is thus capable of feeding upon itself; if left unchecked as a force, it is 
capable of creating the bubbles in markets previously discussed. 
 
Speculative action within markets has existed as long as markets themselves.  Numerous 
and notable historical examples give witness to the bubbles that can arise as a result.  
Instances that have gained notoriety include the Dutch ‘tulip mania’ of the 17th century, 
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange in the late 1920s, Japanese stock and real estate 
markets in the late 1980s as well as the US ‘dot com’ bubble of the NASDAQ in the                                                         5 Alan Greenspan, “The Challence of Central Banking in a Democratic Society,” speech before the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1996, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/19961205.htm 6 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005), Second Edition, p. 
68-69. 7 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(John Wiley & Sons Inc., Hoboken: 2005), Fifth Edition, p. 11. 
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1990s.  The US (and in many cases international) real estate boom from 2001 to 2005 
was of similar magnitude and will undoubtedly become a textbook scenario in the future. 
 
2.7 Identifying Bubbles 
 
One of the greatest difficulties in evaluating economic ‘bubbles’ is that they are almost 
impossible to identify except in hindsight.  Most economists’ work includes assumptions 
that incorporate some form of an Efficient Market Hypothesis, indicating that the price of 
assets within a competitive marketplace accurately reflect their intrinsic value.  Given 
this belief, a ‘bubble’ can only be safely declared after it has already ‘burst’, or the 
market has ‘reset’ the value of the assets concerned.  Until that sudden fall in prices, or 
‘reset’ occurs, it is nearly impossible to distinguish with any certainty whether a 
continued increase in prices stems from changes in genuine economic factors or simple 
speculation on the part of the market. 
 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis is consistent with a widely held belief among most 
Keynesian economists that modern economies, perhaps with the help of regulation, 
should trend toward a stable equilibrium at which output is maximized for a given level 
of unemployment.  Within this perspective, market bubbles can only be caused by 
exogenous shocks to an otherwise stable economy: rational players in efficient markets 
would have no other reason to temporarily overvalue or undervalue assets within a given 
market. 
 
2.8 Introduction to Minsky 
 
Economist Hyman P. Minsky offered a view that purports to contain greater explanatory 
power of bubbles.  Observing the continuing tendency of economies and markets to 
overheat, he interpreted Keynes’ work in a way that led him to a radically different 
conclusion from his contemporaries.  Today, Minsky is perhaps best known for his 
Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), in which he theorizes that capitalist financial 
systems are inherently unstable.  He concluded that modern economies sow the seeds for 
their own destruction by arguing that complex financial infrastructures encourage 
speculation and consequently the inevitably ensuing crisis. 
 
Minsky believed that this financial fragility was inherently linked with the wider business 
cycle as a whole, and recent experience would seem to support this hypothesis: financial 
crashes in recent US history have all been followed by business cycle contractions, 
including 1929, 1989, 2000, and 2007.  Indeed it is apparent that the 1929 and 2008 
crises played pivotal roles in the Great Depression and current recession respectively. 
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Hyman Minsky’s views regarding the structure of a modern economy went against the 
grain of those of his more widely touted and studied contemporaneous colleagues.  
Observing the repeated cycle of boom and bust within financial markets and among the 
financial institutions that play dominant roles in such markets, Minsky began to think 
about the structure of a modern financial economy and its potential fragility.  While other 
economists worked to explain away each of those instances individually, attributing each 
one to ‘exogenous shocks’, Minsky began to suspect that qualities of the economy itself 
might be a contributing factor to the apparently sinusoidal pattern that markets and 
economic production appeared to follow: 
 
The financial instability hypothesis has both empirical and theoretical 
aspects.  The readily observed empirical aspect is that, from time to time, 
capitalist economies exhibit inflations and debt deflations which seem to 
have the potential to spin out of control.  In such processes the economic 
system’s reactions to a movement of the economy amplify the 
movement—inflation feeds upon inflation and debt-deflation feeds upon 
debt deflation…These historical episodes are evidence supporting the 
view that the economy does not always conform to the classic precepts of 
Smith and Walras: they implied that the economy can best be understood 
by assuming that it is constantly an equilibrium seeking and sustaining 
system.8 
 
His observation of the historical economic experience within the United States led him to 
disagree with the predominantly held opinion among economists that an economy had a 
fundamental predisposition to seek and maintain a neat and tidy equilibrium.  
Consequently Minsky chose to examine how the structures and nature of a capitalist 
economy might contribute to its fragility and eventually downfall. 
 
3.2 Financial System within a Modern Economy 
 
Minsky highlights the importance of financing within a capitalist system while setting up 
his exploration of a capitalist economy.  He observes “in a capitalist economy the past, 
the present, and the future are linked not only by capital assets and labor force 
characteristics but also by financial relations.”9  His recognition of finance and financing 
as an important factor when examining the functioning of an economy was a crucial step 
in discovering the reasons why a modern economy might be less stable than economists’ 
models otherwise suppose.                                                         8 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”.  Working Paper No. 74.  Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992 9 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”.  Working Paper No. 74.  Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992 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Observing the interactions within an economy through the lens of financing, Minsky 
consequently devotes some focus to financial institutions and their role in facilitating 
business expansion through the extension of finance.  Rather than limiting his 
understanding of finance to simply examining firm and business behavior from their 
incentives according to finance (i.e. engaging in balance sheet examinations of liabilities 
and assets) however, he comes to the conclusion that other players in the economy who 
have access to financing must also have their behavior explained in terms of these 
fundamental incentives, and the role they play upon the banks and each other: 
 
In the modern world, analyses of financial relations and their implications 
for system behavior cannot be restricted to the liability structure of 
businesses and the cash flows they entail.  Households (by way of their 
ability to borrow on credit cards for big ticket consumer goods such as 
automobiles, house purchases, and to carry financial assets), governments 
(with their large floating and funded debts), and international units (as a 
result of the internationalization of finance) have liability structures which 
the current performance of the economy either validates or invalidates.10 
 
Minsky’s financial system thus encompasses all sectors and players in a modern economy 
where access to capital is widely available.  This broadened view of a financial system 
means that his study encompasses the incentives of any and all debtors and lenders in his 
analysis of the fragility of a financial economy. 
 
3.3 Importance of Financial Sector in Modern Economy 
 
Central to Minsky’s argument regarding the unpredictability and instability of a modern 
economy is the role of finance and financial institutions within such an economic system.  
He goes so far as to explicitly state: “Our economy is unstable because of capitalist 
finance.”11  Minsky would thus not have been at all surprised that the increasingly serious 
financial crises that have taken place since the end of World War II have been 
accompanied by a continual increase in the relative importance of the financial industry 
within the United States economy.  The following chart tracks the Economic Share of the 
Finance Industry within the US over time, as measured by the ratio of annual Financial 
Industry income to GDP.   
 
                                                        10 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”.  Working Paper No. 74.  Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992 11 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (McGraw Hill, New York: 2008), originally 
published Princeton University Press: 1986, p. 244. 
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Fig. 3A     GDP Share of U.S. Financial Industry  
 12 
A cursory glance is enough to indicate that over the last century and a half the Financial 
Industry has been consistently more important to the US economy.  The notable 
exception to this trend are the years following the stock market crash of 1929, i.e. those 
of the Great Depression, when the financial industry was in dire straits.  Since the 
emergence of the US from the Depression and following the end of World War II, the 
Financial Industry has grown consistently relative to the rest of the US economy.  Indeed, 
over the last 150 years it has evidently roughly quadrupled its share of the GDP. 
 
This growing weight of the financial industry within the US economy has unsurprisingly 
been accompanied by financial innovations, increasingly complex financial instruments, 
greater and more intricate entanglements between financial institutions of growing 
importance, and finally panics and crashes of increasing frequency and severity.  Minsky, 
writing in 1986, identified “In the years following 1965, at least four serious runs…on 
financial markets or banks.”13  These included a credit crunch in 1966, as well as 
liquidity issues in the commercial paper market in 1969-1970.  Since the time of the 
writing, the crises have continued and even worsened—the Savings and Loans crisis in 
1989-1991, the collapse of the stock market in 2001, and most recently the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market all demonstrate that despite assumptions to the contrary, our 
economy is as susceptible as ever to speculative mania and crashes.   
 
Indeed, as the financial sector has continued to grow in relative importance as a 
component of the economy, the severity of these crashes have also continued to worsen.  
Though the efforts of regulatory authorities have managed to stave off a downturn as 
severe as the Great Depression, the attempts to stabilize the economy have apparently                                                         12 Thomas Philippon, “The Evolution of the US Financial Industry from 1860 to 2007”.  New York 
University, NBER and CEPR. November 2008 13 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (McGraw Hill, New York: 2008), originally 
published Princeton University Press: 1986, p. 106. 
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only succeeded in delaying inevitable crashes—crashes that apparently worsen as 
previous fixes to the system prove to be inadequate.  It is unsurprising that a broader and 
more complex financial system has proven to be less stable and prone to more serious 
crashes—not only is such a system much more difficult to effectively regulate, but a 
financial system more widely embedded throughout the economy means wider exposure 
to various consumers, investors, firms and governments to problems within financial 
markets.  This correlative relationship between the relative size of the financial sector and 
the apparent severity of its bouts of instability is one which Minsky would have 
predicted. 
 
3.4 Theorems of Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
Minksy’s Financial Instability Hypothesis rests upon two primary theorems: 
 
Theorem I: ‘the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and 
financing regimes in which it is unstable.’14 
 
Theorem II: ‘over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transmits from 
financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make 
for an unstable system.’15 
 
The logical sum of these theorems is the conclusion that the financial system contributes 
to the instability of an economy by shifting from predominantly reasonably safe and 
stable financial arrangements to arrangements that are prone to collapse and cause 
significant financial and economic damage. 
 
3.5 Stable and Unstable Financial Arrangements 
 
In order to satisfy his two theorems above, Minsky must demonstrate a difference 
between stable and unstable financing regimes.  To that end, he identifies three distinct 
categories of financial arrangement that he terms hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance. 
 
Hedge finance consists of financing whereby the borrower is able to meet all of his 
contractual payment obligations through his cash flows. 
 
Speculative finance describes financing whereby the borrower is able to make interest 
payments through cash flows, but is unable to make payments toward the principle.  In 
such a financial scheme, one must ‘roll over’ liabilities to maintain solvency: for example 
by issuing new debt to pay off maturing debt commitments. 
 
Ponzi finance describes a financing whereby through cash flows alone the borrower is 
unable to meet either interest or principal payments, let alone both.  Solvency for the                                                         14 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”.  Working Paper No. 74.  Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992 15 Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”.  Working Paper No. 74.  Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992 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borrower in this situation relies upon price inflation—as the asset he has financed 
appreciates in value, the debtor may take out additional debt against gains in equity.  If 
the asset does not appreciate quickly enough, or even loses value, the debtor is unable to 
meet payment obligations. 
 
3.6 Theorem I 
 
In regards to Theorem I, Minsky makes the case that an economy dominated by hedge 
financing may well be equilibrium seeking and definitely possesses a degree of stability.  
Conversely an economy dominated by speculative and/or Ponzi finance will be prone to 
deviations from any equilibrium, as powerful feedback cycles are present. 
 
The positive feedback cycle is self-evident: as a Ponzi economy progresses and asset 
prices increase from due economic gains, investors see gains and borrow to increase 
investment, pushing asset prices up further.  As long as asset prices are rising, Ponzi 
investors are successfully making money, and will continue to invest in a Ponzi manner. 
 
The negative feedback cycle involves what has come to be called a ‘Minsky Moment’: 
when asset prices cease to increase, Ponzi borrowers are unable to refinance to meet debt 
obligations.  Failed payments will cause a ‘domino effect’ as financial institutions will 
mark down bad debt on their books.  It can quickly create a perfect storm in financial 
markets, causing the shutdown of an entire financial system, as in 2008-2009.  In such a 
situation, even hedge borrowers with sound investments are unable to secure financing as 
financial institutions are unable to cope with losses and are unwilling to extend any 
credit. 
 
3.7 Theorem II 
 
In regards to Theorem II, Minsky must prove that incentives change during a boom 
economy, causing investors to shift from sound hedge financing, toward speculative and 
Ponzi financing.  The shift in financing schemes might be caused by an increase in risk 
appetite during the boom phase of an economy: as investors witness a trend of stability, 
they become more willing to invest in riskier assets and borrow to fund said investment. 
 
This shift in investor sentiment cannot be explained adequately by rational investors 
acting with full information—such an investor has forward-looking expectations based 
upon the axiom that past performance is no indicator of future performance, i.e. one 
cannot predict future market movement based on past events.  Instead, this change in 
sentiment comes about because investors are ‘driving by looking in the rear-view mirror’; 
a strategy that succeeds while the road is straight but cannot predict turns.  Investors as a 
whole are irrational and have short memories, and thus inexorably become convinced that 
recent economic and financial success will continue in the future if for no other reason 
than it has in the past.  In this way, investor appetite across the economy shifts due to 
fluctuations in Keynes’ ‘animal spirits’. 
 
Risk appetite might be considered the desire of an investor to achieve higher returns at 
the expense of certainty—it has a negative correlation with the risk premium demanded 
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by investors for taking on a riskier asset.  For example, as an investor becomes more 
interested in riskier assets, he becomes more willing to accept a lower risk premium to 
invest in those assets.  In such a situation, his risk appetite might be said to have grown. 
 
According to Theorem II of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, as an economy 
experiences a ‘boom’, or prolonged stable growth, incentives must change so that 
investors begin to take on greater risk, and begin to engage in speculative and Ponzi 
finance as opposed to hedge finance.  Minsky would expect to see risk appetite grow as a 





This paper will be concerned primarily with Theorem II, and will seek to investigate 
whether and how incentives of investors change during a ‘boom’ economy. 
 
Specifically, it will primarily attempt to answer the following question: does risk appetite 
increase as an economy undergoes prolonged periods of growth and stability and assets 
from various asset classes produce positive returns?  While this relationship is predicted 
qualitatively by both a variety of authors and common sense, this paper will test these 
assumptions empirically.  Historical data and econometric techniques will be used to 
establish the nature of the relationship (if any) between market returns and economic 




Part I: Positive market and economic results over a period of time cause investors to 
increase their risk appetite.   
 
Part II: Increases in risk appetite that accompany or predict market gains may indicate 
that market gains are due not to fundamental economic changes but rather widespread 
investor speculation.  Such increases in risk appetite and asset value presage ‘Minsky 
moments’ wherein market resets will damage financial institutions and thus the wider 
economy.  Such fluctuations in risk appetite might be used by central banks and other 
regulatory authorities as a consistent method of identifying when asset price increases are 
due not to changes in the fundamental qualities of the assets, but rather a wave of investor 
speculation.  As such speculative bubbles are known to give rise to tenuously dangerous 
situations among financial institutions, regulatory authorities might use a rise in risk-
appetite as a leading indicator of future bubbles.  They might then take appropriate action 
to limit the expansion of credit accordingly. 
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4—LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Many books have been written about the history of financial crises and the apparently all-
too-human penchant of speculators’ overconfidence quickly leading to spectacular 
crashes.  Notable titles include (in alphabetical order by author): 
 
Chancellor, Edward: Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation, 1999 
Kindleberger, Charles: Manias, Panics, and Crashes, 1978 
Reinhart, Carmen M. & Kenneth S. Rogoff: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly, 2009 
Shiller, Robert: Irrational Exuberance, 2000 
 
These titles include an excellent review of the long history of financial crises, and offer 
documentation of the often-spectacular nature in which financial bubbles and crashes 
manifest themselves. 
 
Chancellor’s work primarily examines several notable financial crashes from the 
perspective of a historical narrative.  Less concerned with compiling a unifying theory, 
Devil Take the Hindmost nevertheless provides an excellent and detailed overview of 
financial crises such as the U.S. stock market crash of 1929 and the Japanese economy 
during the 1980s.  Beginning with a broad history of financial speculation and the role 
speculators play in the buildup of bubbles, Chancellor comes to the conclusion that: 
 
Momentum trading, trend-following currency speculators, overleveraged 
hedge funds, and corporate managements obsessed with daily fluctuations 
in share quotations are unlikely to produce the optimal distribution of 
scarce resources in the global economy.16 
 
That is, the role of markets in contributing to the efficient allocation of funds within an 
economy can easily be overstepped when participants seeking to make quick profits 
dominate proceedings.  Any contribution of such speculation to economic efficiency is 
apparently outweighed by the risks it presents to the stability of the financial system and 
wider economy as a whole. 
 
Charles Kindleberger first published his Manias, Panics, and Crashes in 1978.  His work 
seeks to reach conclusions regarding the general structure and nature of financial bubbles 
and subsequent crises through the examination of a variety of crashes across various 
markets throughout history.  Interestingly for this paper, he was familiar with the theories 
of Hyman Minsky, and he made many of his historical studies through the lens of the 
then-nascent Financial Instability Hypothesis.  He pays particular attention to the role of 
credit in facilitating the formation of bubbles: 
                                                         16 Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, New York: 1999), p. 346. 
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Speculative manias gather speed through expansion of money and credit.  
Most expansions of money and credit do not lead to a mania; there are 
many more economic expansions than there are manias.  But every mania 
has been associated with the expansion of credit.17 (emphasis added) 
 
He notes further that in many instances, the expansion of credit came not through an 
actual increase in the money supply, but rather in the development of substitutes to 
traditional currencies in settling debts and providing collateral.  He thus makes the 
assertion that faster-than-normal expansion of credit is almost universally a crucial culprit 
in allowing enthusiastic speculation to become a force capable of creating dangerous 
asset bubbles.  He also later expands upon Minsky’s model by examining the often-
international nature of such bubbles and crises.  To that end, the book includes a 
discussion of the mechanisms by which such phenomena might cross national 
boundaries, and the role that exchange rates, currency crises and monetary flows play in 
‘spreading the contagion’.    
 
Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance in particular makes use of compiled data dating back to 
the late 19th century in order to trace his points through historical markets.  In addition, he 
writes at length about the positive amplification mechanisms that lead to dramatic 
changes in investor confidence.  He continues with an examination of various relevant 
ideas concerning the operation of markets, including the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
what he terms investor ‘learning and unlearning’.  This refers to the same phenomenon 
discussed more empirically by Minsky as the shifting of investor incentives within an 
economy.  He concludes by discussing methods by which speculative enthusiasm might 
be dampened by governmental and regulatory authorities—his ideas range from 
improving fundamentals such as fiscal responsibility through Social Security reform, and 
altering incentives to increase saving, to diversification and hedging of risks by amateur 
investors to contractionary monetary policy.  However, he concludes by observing: 
 
Ultimately, in a free society, we cannot protect people from all the 
consequences of their own errors.  We cannot protect people completely 
without denying them the possibility of achieving their own fulfillment.  
We cannot completely protect society from the effects of waves of 
irrational exuberance or irrational pessimism—emotional reactions that 
are themselves part of the human condition.18 
 
Thus, Shiller believes that the variability of emotion ingrained within the human psyche 
gives rise to the possibly damaging cycles of pessimism and optimism witnessed in the 
broader markets.  Removing completely the possibility of these waves from the markets 
is therefore impossible so long as humans—fundamentally emotional beings—remain the 
ultimate market participants. 
                                                         17 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(John Wiley & Sons Inc., Hoboken: 2005), Fifth Edition, p. 64. 18 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2005) Second Edition, p. 
230. 
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Shiller’s book further proves useful as the source of much of the data used in the 
econometric analysis that this paper will pursue.  The publication of his book required 
long-term data on stock markets, real interest rates, inflation rates, housing price indices 
etc.  All of the data he uses to reach his conclusions is freely available in digital format 
online at: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.  The specific data this paper makes 
use of will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
In addition, Hyman Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 2008), outlines the fundamentals of Minsky’s hypothesis that financial capitalist 
economies are inherently unstable.  He discusses at length the natural inclination of 
complex economies toward instability due to speculative finance and high-risk lending 
practices.  Finally, he proposes measures that ought to be taken by the government and 
Federal Reserve in order to increase oversight of banks and stop excessively risky 
speculative practices before they have the chance to disturb the economy as a whole.  
Further, he composed the paper “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”, Working Paper 
No. 74 from the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992, which gives a brief 
summary of his FIH and the mechanisms by which financial structures within a complex 
capitalist economy give rise to instability.  In it he outlines his theorems and the 3 types 
of finance discussed above. 
 
Recent relevant papers include: 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M. & Kenneth S. Rogoff: “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View 
of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises”, NBER Working Paper No. 13882, 
available online at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13882 
Reinhart, Carmen M. & Kenneth S. Rogoff: “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 14656, available online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14656 
Vercelli, Alessandro: “A Perspective on Minsky Moments: The Core of the Financial 
Instability Hypothesis in Light of the Subprime Crisis”, Working Paper No. 579, 
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, October 2009. 
http://www.levy.org/vdoc.aspx?docid=1202 
Vercelli, Alessandro: “Minsky Moments, Russell Chickens, and Gray Swans: The 
Methodological Puzzles of the Financial Instability Analysis”, Working Paper No. 
582, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, November 2009. 
http://www.levy.org/vdoc.aspx?docid=1207 
Whalen, Charles J.: “The U.S. Credit Crunch of 2007: A Minsky Moment”, Public Policy 
Brief No. 92, 2007, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
http://www.levy.org/vdoc.aspx?docid=961 
 
These papers address issues ranging from the widely negative effects that financial 
shocks have on wider economies as a whole (Reinhart & Rogoff’s “Aftermath”), to 
closely examining mechanisms proposed by Minsky’s FIH and how they might 





5.1 Overview  
 
This paper will attempt to answer its primary question through the use of a time-series 
regression.  The dependent variable will be risk appetite, and independent variables will 
include historical asset yields in debt, equity and real estate markets as well as GDP 
growth data.  Historical asset yields will be used to give some indication of the progress 
in a given economic market, while GDP data will be used to indicate the health of a 
domestic economy as a whole.  All returns and the GDP data will be in real terms to 
factor out the influence of inflation on yields and GDP growth. 
 
Risk appetite, the dependent variable, will be measured quantitatively as the spread 
between corporate bond yields of different credit quality and similar maturity.  As the 
risk appetite of investors increases, investors will sell higher-rated bonds to buy higher-
yielding, lower-rated bonds, narrowing the yield spread.  Conversely as investors become 
more risk-averse, they will sell lower-rated bonds to buy higher-rated bonds, seen as the 
safer alternative, thereby widening the yield spread between the two.  Thus risk appetite 
will have a negative correlation to the yield spread, and a narrower spread will indicate 
a higher risk appetite.  It will appear in the regression as At. 
 
5.2 Manipulating Data to Simulate Investor Memory 
 
In Minsky’s view the current investor risk appetite is not based solely upon current 
economic conditions and gains in asset prices, but also those of the recent past as well.  
This makes sense intuitively, as it is only through a string of consistent gains that 
naturally risk-averse investors might be convinced to abandon their normal reservations 
in favor of riskier investments.  I.e., the assumption is that their perception of the risks 
that a given investment involves changes over time as the investment provides 
consistently positive returns, and soon investors imagine the instrument to be less risky 
than it actually is.  Thus the independent variables in any regression must in some form 
take into account recent historical returns as well as current returns. 
 
There are conceivably many ways to accomplish this, the easiest of which might be to 
simply add lag values of the independent variables into the regression, and examining 
their coefficients for significance to determine how many might be reasonably included.  




At = β0 + β1xt + β2xt−1 ++ εt  
 
A second sensible method would be to transform the data using a simple moving average 
of present and historical returns.  Thus one might create the variable vt from individual 





∑ /m   
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vt  here is simply the arithmetic mean of m observations, beginning with the current 
observation ut and continuing backwards in time. This method would make sense, as it 
would allow the regression to be done over smoothed data, while still taking into account 
data from m observations in a single independent variable.   
 
However, such a moving average is perhaps too limiting.  It rigidly provides an equal 
weight to every observation uti  included in vt.  Secondly, it necessitates a decision on the 
part of the author to determine the correct value of m to be used.  Further, it suffers from 
a weakness in its treatment of data that is significantly outside the normal trend.  Data 
from truly exceptional observations, such as the stock market crash of 1929, would 
necessarily have a tremendous effect on any moving averages in which it was included.  
Thus, as an example, if one were to use an m of 7—i.e. to include 7 data points in the 
moving average—and the observations from 1929 presented a radical departure from the 
ordinary trends, v1936 would likewise exhibit a huge jump from v1935.  This behavior 
clearly presents a problem for the purposes of this paper: it is not reasonable to suppose 
that an investor might have an equally weighted memory of the behavior of a given 
market for m years following a radical market event and then forget about it entirely.  A 
simple moving average therefore is too arbitrary in its nature. 
 
Instead, this paper will transform the historical time-series data into a useful form for a 
regression of ‘memory’ through the use of a Koyck distributed lag transformation. 
 




vt = λut + λ(1− λ)ut−1 + λ(1− λ)2ut−2 +  
 




vt+1 = λut+1 + λ(1− λ)ut + λ(1− λ)2ut−1 + 
 









vt = λut + (1− λ)vt−1 
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Using a λ such that 
€ 
0 < λ <1, the weight terms conveniently add up to 1, and can thus be 
considered probabilities or percentage weights.19 
 
Thus, use of this transformation thus creates a variable that includes data from the current 
year with a percentage weight of λ assigned to the current year and (1-λ) distributed over 
the previous years.  A higher value of λ would thus indicate a ‘weaker memory’ on the 
part of the investor, as he gives greater attention to the current and most recent returns; 
conversely, one might use a low value of λ to indicate that an investor only puts slight 
weight on the current year and is mindful of historical returns. 
 
The chart below illustrates three possible distribution profiles of the Koyck weights based 
upon three possible values of λ = 0.1, λ = 0.2, and λ = 0.3.  As can be seen clearly, a 
higher value of λ indicates a greater weight given to the more recent observations at the 





19 This is shown concisely in the following proof: 
  
€ 
λ + λ(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)2 + =
λ(1+ (1− λ) + (1− λ)2 +) =
λ






5.3 Considering Variance of Returns as an Independent Variable 
  
If two different assets have identical expected returns and different variances or standard 
deviations of returns, a risk-averse investor will prefer the instrument with a lower 
variance of returns.  This makes sense given that higher yields must generally 
compensate investors to accept instruments with a higher degree of risk—a risk-averse 
investor would thus prefer asset A with guaranteed return at rate x over asset B with an 
expected return of rate x and a variance of returns > 0. 
  
Therefore one might also consider the variance of returns of various assets as a measure 
that might have some affect on Minsky’s risk appetite.  The expectation would be that 
historically lower variances of returns of assets would have the same effect as historically 
high returns of assets—by causing investors to forget about the risks involved, they 
would increase risk appetite and thus decrease the bond spread. 
  
Because   
€ 
λ + λ(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)2 + =1 for 
€ 
0 < λ <1, the weight term, (
€ 
λ 1− λ( )n ), can be 
conceptualized as the percentage of weight given by an investor to the historical data of a 
specific year.  As discussed above, the Koyck Distributed Lag thus provides a synthetic 
piece of data that is the sum of present and historical data, discounted by the weight 
terms. 
  
Therefore a measure of variance using the Koyck Distributed Lag value as a benchmark 
will be considered.  This measure, dt-, will be constructed as follows: 
  
€ 
dt = (ut − vt )2  
  
where ut and vt are the actual and Koyck-lagged returns for period t respectively.  The 
difference between actual and expected value is squared as variance puts equal weight 
upon positive and negative deviations. 
  
This measure, dt will then also be transformed using the Koyck technique as discussed 
above, to provide a similar investor perspective on both recent and historical variance, 
but with an appropriate precedence given to the more recent variance over historical 




vart =ωdt +ω(1−ω)dt−1 +ω(1−ω)2dt−2 + 
  
and ω plays an identical role to λ above, providing weights to the various terms. 
  
5.4 ‘Deviations’ of Returns as an Independent Variable 
  
In many instances, standard deviations provide a more accurate illustration of variation 
within a set of data.  Therefore regressions may also use the value devt, where: 
 
€ 
devt = vart  
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These measures of deviation are simply designed to remove any distortions that squaring 
the differences between ut and vt may cause by taking the square root of the previously 




6.1 Data Sources 
 
Data for the regressions will be compiled from a variety of separate sources. 
 
For the sake of simplicity in equity markets, this paper uses historical data from Standard 
and Poor’s Composite Stock Index.  This data is taken from the collection of Yale 
economist Robert Shiller.  It was originally compiled with for the purpose of his book 
Market Volatility (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA: 1989), and was subsequently utilized in 
his Irrational Exuberance (Princeton University Press 2000, Broadway Books 2001, 2nd 
ed., 2005). The dataset contains information about stock prices, dividends and corporate 
earnings extending back to January 1871, compiled from a variety of sources.  It can be 
accessed online at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls. 
 
For historical data in the real estate market, this paper utilizes a similar source: the 
historical housing market data collected for use in Irrational Exuberance (Princeton 
University Press 2000, Broadway Books 2001, 2nd ed., 2005). The dataset has 
information on fluctuations in U.S. home prices since 1890.  It is available online at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls. 
 
U.S. GDP data is taken from two sources.  For the years 1929 to 2009 it is taken from 
FRED®, the Federal Reserve Economic Data source.  It was accessed at the website of 
the St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve Bank at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCA?cid=106, and represents Real Gross 
Domestic Product for the U.S., chain-weighted in 2005 dollars.  For years prior to 1929, 
the data is from a series compiled by Louis Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, found 
online at http://www.measuringworth.org/datasets/usgdp/.  This dataset is preferable to 
the GNP data available at The Historical Statistics of the United States website, as it 
requires no conversion of GNP to GDP, and is further priced in 2005 dollars just as the 
data taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data series. 
 
Real historical bond returns are taken from the Inflation Adjusted Annual Returns series 
of the Long-Term Corporate Bond Index used in the book Ibbotson® SBBI® 2010 
Classic Yearbook: Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926-2009, 
(Morningstar, Inc., Chicago: 2010).  The bond index is a combination of the Citigroup 
Long-Term High-Grade Corporate Bond Index (formerly Salomon Brothers) and 
Standard & Poor’s monthly High Grade Corporate Composite.20  Thus bond returns as 
used in the regressions represent the annual returns from a portfolio of high-grade, credit-
worthy debt.                                                         20 Ibbotson® SBBI® 2010 Classic Yearbook: Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926-
2009, (Morningstar, Inc., Chicago: 2010), p.45. 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For historical corporate bond yield information, this paper will make use of two data 
series made available from the Economic Research Department of the St. Louis branch of 
the Federal Reserve Bank.  Both Moody’s Seasoned AAA and BAA Bond yields are 
used, and the datasets are accessed at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AAA?cid=119 and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BAA?cid=119 respectively.  This data is 
released in monthly increments, so for the annual regressions the simple arithmetic mean 
of the twelve individual months is used to create an annual interest rate in either series. 
 
Historical bond spread information, or the proxy for risk appetite, is synthesized by 
combining the historical yield data for corporate bonds of differing credit quality.  That 
is, the risk appetite for a given period, At, is simply equal to the yield spread between 
corporate bonds of similar maturity and differing quality: At = YieldBBB  – YieldAAA. 
 
6.2 Data Issues 
 
One initial concern is a possibly high degree of correlation between two or more of the 
several explanatory variables.  Because these variables are primarily concerned with 
capital and debt market returns, real estate market movements, and GDP growth, the 
expected level of correlation between two or more datasets might be high.  After all, the 
financial markets are closely interconnected and could easily be considered two different 
asset classes in the same portfolios.  Further, the stock market is often conceptualized as a 
leading indicator—because its prices reflect predicted future earnings growth, it could 
very possibly be closely tied to changes in real GDP.  Even if it fails to predict them, it is 
unlikely that it would fail to reflect them in the aftermath—as GDP grows and companies 
become more profitable, their share prices increase to reflect this.  The converse is also 
true, with stock prices falling in recessionary times in response to declining corporate 
profits. 
 
A second potential issue is the suitability of the Koyck weighted lag as an appropriate 
transformation to the data to simulate investor memory.  Figure 5A illustrates how such a 
manipulation of the raw data could be interpreted as the fading memory of past results. 
However, the task remains to select the appropriate weights of λ for each of the sectors 
being examined.  It is even quite possible that in different sectors, different values of λ 
will be most appropriate, as investors may have effective memories of varying lengths in 
the different arenas.  For example, investors may more quickly forget about a drop in 
GDP than a crash in the stock market—while the former is a negative indicator about the 
future prospects of the economy, the latter can directly affect their wealth if the value of 





7.1 Regression I: Koyck Distributed Lags 
 
The initial econometric exploration in this paper involved regressing the yield spread 
between Moody’s AAA and BBB bonds against Koyck lags of changes in the real GDP, 
stock market returns, bond market returns and housing price changes.  It took the form: 
 
€ 
At = β0 + β1Stockt + β2GDPt + β3Houset + β4Bondt + εt  
 
At = YieldBBB  – YieldAAA  (yield spread between AAA and BBB bonds) 
Stockt = Koyck distributed lag of annual returns in the stock markets, with a weight of 0.1 
on the current year t. 
GDPt = Koyck distributed lag of annual change in real GDP, with a weight of 0.1 on the 
current year t. 
Houset = Koyck distributed lag of annual change in residential housing prices, with a 
weight of 0.1 on the current year t. 
Bondt = Koyck distributed lag of annual change in index measuring bond returns, with a 
weight of 0.1 on the current year t. 
 
Performing this regression in Stata for the years available (1928-2009, n=81) yielded 
some fairly strong results: 
 
At Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Stockt -10.66518 1.190445 -8.96 0.000*** 
GDPt -29.25349 3.727623 -7.85 0.000*** 
Houset -9.575066 3.256409 -2.94 0.004*** 
Bondt 2.98932 1.209069 2.47 0.016** 
n = 81 
R2 = .7538 
 
Stockt, GDPt, Houset, are all found to be statistically significant explanatory variables, at 
the 1% confidence level, with p-values of 0.000, 0.000, and 0.004 respectively.  Bondt is 
also found to be statistically significant at a reasonable confidence level of 5% with a p-
value of 0.016.  Further, the absolute value of its coefficient is significantly less than that 
of the others, suggesting that returns in the Bond market are relatively unimportant 
relative to the other three markets in determining risk appetite.  
 
The three significant explanatory variables all have negative coefficients, as was expected 
in the hypothesis stated above.  A higher value of any of the explanatory variables Stockt, 
GDPt, Houset, (or Bondt) indicates greater gains (or growth in the case of GDP) in recent 
years in the market in question.  The negative coefficients indicate that better 
performance in markets are associated with lower values of At, or the bond spread.  As 
discussed above, such a tighter spread indicates a higher appetite for risk, and therefore 
the regression suggests that a trend of good performance in markets can in part 
explain an increase in risk appetite.  Interestingly Bondt has a positive coefficient, 
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suggesting that better returns in bond markets are associated with higher values of At, or a 
higher yield spread and lower risk appetite.   
 
This phenomenon is contrary to the expectations.  One possible explanation is a 
consideration of the role debt instruments tend to play for investors as a ‘safe vehicle’ for 
gains—i.e. bond markets experience gains as investors plow money into bonds for fear of 
other markets performing poorly.  A second explanation is that perhaps interest rates rise 
in good times (i.e. when other markets and GDP are performing well), and consequently 
bonds experience capital losses, though risk-appetite is still increasing. 
 
A closer examination of the relationship between the Koyck lagged measure of GDP 
(with λ = 0.1) and the return of the bond index reveals that this might be the case.  The 





The above chart further illustrates the fairly strong linear relationship between the Koyck 
weighted changes in real GDP and the return on the corporate bond index, indicating that 
this relationship may have something to do with the unexpected positive value of Bondt’s 
coefficient. 
 
7.2 Robustness of Regression I 
 
The robustness of this result might be called into question if either there were a high 
degree of correlation among the independent variables, or autocorrelation existed within 
the residuals. 
 
The tale below shows the correlation statistics between each of the explanatory variables: 
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 Stockt GDPt Houset Bondt 
Stockt 1.0000    
GDPt 0.0296 1.0000   
Houset 0.1782 0.2179 1.0000  
Bondt -0.0224 -0.4383 -0.2857 1.0000 
 
Given that these variables measure rates of change/returns in interconnected financial 
markets and the domestic GDP growth that they seek to predict, the levels of correlation 
are not as high as might have been expected.  The notable exception is the somewhat high 





Figure 7B contains a scatterplot charting GDPt against Bondt for the years 1926-2009 
(both with a λ of 0.1).  The closeness of this relationship is not surprising given the 
observation discussed above: that economic booms are often accompanied by increasing 
interest rates, and that bonds experience capital losses as interest rates rise.  
 
The second major concern for robustness is the possible presence of serial correlation.  
Several methods exist to test for autocorrelation among time series residuals.  This paper 
will make use of the Breusch and Godfrey (Godfrey 1998) test: 
 
In this test, the regression is augmented with p lagged residual series.  
The null hypothesis is that the errors are serially independent up to order 
p.  The test evaluates the partial correlations of the regressors x 
partialled off.  The residuals at time t are orthogonal to the columns of x 
at time t, but that need not be so for the lagged residuals. This is perhaps 
the most useful test for nonindependence of time-series disturbances, 
since it allows the researcher to examine more than first-order serial 
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independence of the errors in one test.21 
 
When conducted on the above regression, the Breusch and Godfrey test for 
autocorrelation up to the 5th order yields the following results: 
     
lags(p) chi2               df Prob > chi2 
1 26.556              1 0.0000 
2 28.335               2 0.0000 
3 29.184               3 0.0000 
4 30.410               4 0.0000 
5 30.452               5 0.0000 
 
This result reassures to a high degree of certainty (no P-value above .0000) that no 
autocorrelation exists among the residuals of the regression. 
 
7.3 Regression II: Koyck Distributed Lags and Koyck Lagged Variance Measures 
 
The next regression will add the variance measures discussed in 5.3 above to the 
regression.  There will be one such independent variable for each of the four variables 
explored above.  For this determining the Koyck weights in this regression, 
€ 
λ =ω = 0.1 
for all each independent variable. 
 
The regression takes the form: 
 
€ 
At = β0 + β1Stockt + β2GDPt + β3Houset + β4Bondt +
β5StockVart + β6GDPVart + β7HouseVart + β8BondVart + εt
 
 
At Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Stockt -7.668063 1.363588 -5.62 0.000*** 
GDPt -29.02499 4.150915 -6.99 0.000*** 
Houset -12.18303 3.28382 -3.71 0.000*** 
Bondt -.0152807 1.543665 -0.01 0.992 
StockVart 17.57104 6.878973 2.55 0.013** 
GDPVart -30.33315 72.67892 -0.42 0.678 
HouseVart -22.96049 55.74776 -0.41 0.682 
BondVart 14.10085 8.496105 1.66 0.101 
n = 81 
R2 = 0.8187 
 
The results are fairly interesting.  Stockt, GDPt, and Houset all retain statistical 
significance, with Houset actually becoming slightly more significant (P-value of 0.000                                                         21 Christopher Baum, An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata (Stata Press, College Station, 
TX: 2006), p. 156. 
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vs. 0.004).  Further, the approximate value of their true coefficients are all reinforced, 
with the new coefficient values well within the 95% confidence range of Regression I. 
Stockt’s β changed from -10.665 to -7.668, GDPt’s β remained practically unchanged 
from -29.253 to -29.025, and Houset’s β changed slightly from -9.575 to -12.183.  Three 
of the four primary regressors thus have the approximate value of their true coefficients 
and their statistical significance confirmed.  Bondt however completely lost any 
semblance of significant impact upon At, with a coefficient of -0.01528 and a new P-
value of 0.992. 
 
Of the new variance measures, only one, StockVart, was found to be statistically 
significant with a P-value of 0.013.  BondVart was close, with a P-value of 0.101, but 
neither GDPVart nor HouseVart were found to be significant, both with P-values > 0.6.  
As was expected, the significant coefficient has a positive value: this suggests that higher 
remembered variations in stock market returns imply a higher bond spread, or lower risk-
appetite.  Thus greater variance of returns can be construed as higher risk, and has the 
appropriate explanatory effect on risk-appetite. 
 
This finding suggests that variance in stock market returns has real power in explaining 
the level of risk-appetite exhibited by investors—perhaps because equity markets are the 
most widely observed gauge of market strength and experience the greatest gyrations of 
any of the three markets measured or GDP.  This is shown in the following table: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
StockVart 138 .0252804 .0149404 0 .0797899 
GDPVart 138 .0021912 .0017607 0 .0077449 
HouseVart 119 .0075975 .0095601 0 .0430519 
BondVart 84 .0066208 .0051348 0 .0202439 
 
 
7.4 Regression III: Koyck Distributed Lags and Koyck Lagged Deviation Measures 
 
The third regression will take a similar approach to the second, simply using measures of 
‘deviation’ instead of variance in returns.  As discussed in 5.4, these values of ‘deviation’ 
are simply the square roots of the variances, so that: 
 
€ 
StockDevt = StockVart , 
€ 
GDPDevt = GDPVart ,
€ 
HouseDevt = HouseVart , 
and
€ 
BondDevt = BondVart  
 
The regression takes the form: 
 
€ 
At = β0 + β1Stockt + β2GDPt + β3Houset + β4Bondt +
β5StockDevt + β6GDPDevt + β7HouseDevt + β8BondDevt + εt
 
 
At Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Stockt -7.343589 1.355864 -5.42 0.000*** 
GDPt -28.54597 3.743827 -7.62 0.000*** 
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Houset -15.39516 4.002414 -3.85 0.000*** 
Bondt -.4992686 1.673525 -0.30 0.766 
StockDevt 8.258447 2.461243 3.36 0.001*** 
GDPDevt -7.162408 6.813327 -1.05 0.297 
HouseDevt .4797787 6.025321 0.08 0.937 




As can be seen, the results are quite similar to those of Regression II.  The coefficients on 
Stockt, GDPt, and Houset, all have their negative, significant coefficients confirmed.  All 
are found to be extremely significant with P-values of 0.000, and have coefficient values 
similar to those found earlier.  Conversely, the coefficient of Bondt has lost its 
significance with a P-value of 0.766. 
 
In addition, while the deviations of changes in GDP and returns in the Housing and Bond 
markets are found to be insignificant (P-values of 0.297, 0.937 and 0.151 respectively), 
StockDevt is found to have a significant positive coefficient with a P-value of 0.001.  As 
in 7.3, its positive value is expected given the risk-averse nature of investors, and this 
regression confirms the validity of those earlier results.  
 
7.5 Significance of Results with respect to Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
Such an econometric analysis of the relationship between risk appetite and market 
returns/GDP growth suggest that Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis may hold 
water.  This finding lends credence to the supposition that the risk appetite of participants 
within an economy might change in response to market and economic performance; this 
in turn lays the groundwork for an effective positive feedback system as described 
earlier; finally, such feedback mechanisms enable the regular inflation of bubbles within 
one or a variety of markets.  Thus, because in a financial market appetite for risk can 
change as a result of market returns, the possibility for a bubble in such an economy is 
omnipresent.  This supports Minsky’s fundamental assertion: 
 
The major flaw of our type of economy is that it is unstable.  This 
instability is not due to external shocks or to the incompetence or 
ignorance of policy makers.  Instability is due to the internal processes of 
our type of economy.  The dynamics of a capitalist economy which has 
complex, sophisticated, and evolving financial structures leads to the 
development of conditions conducive to incoherence—to runaway 
inflations or deep depressions. (emphasis added)22 
                                                        22 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (McGraw Hill, New York: 2008), originally 





The empirically demonstrable relationship between variances and returns in capital 
markets as well as growth in GDP and changes in risk appetite speaks volumes for the 
strength of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis.  Given that every financial 
borrower within an economy fits within one of his three financing schemes of hedge, 
speculative or ponzi, it is not unreasonable to imagine that as the risk appetite of market 
participants increases, they might be more inclined to engage in riskier financing 
schemes.  Given recent experience in the United States financial industry, it is undeniable 
that such a build-up in risk appetite can lead investors to take risks that they do not fully 
understand or appreciate. 
 
Minsky described the process by which such exposure creeps through an economy as 
follows: 
 
Our economy is unstable because of capitalist finance.  If a particular mix 
of hedge and speculative financing of positions and of internal and 
external financing of investment rules for a while, then there are, internal 
to the economy, incentives to change the mix.  Any transitory tranquility is 
transformed into an expansion in which the speculative financing of 
positions and the external financing of investment increase.  An 
investment boom that strips units of liquidity and increases the debt-equity 
ratios for financial institutions follows.  Margins of safety are eroded even 
as success leads to a belief that the prior—and even the present—margins 
are too large.23 
 
Clearly then, the same incentives that cause a shift from hedge to speculative and ponzi 
financing likewise cause both borrowers and lenders to take on increased risk through 
leverage etc. to maximize profits.  The ‘transitory tranquility’ inevitably causes humans 
with a short collective memory to imagine that good times will continue for the 
foreseeable future, and the ‘erosion of margins of safety’ is viewed as sensible in the 
context of what is viewed as a new and safe economy. 
 
On an individual level, such risk-taking is not damaging to the wider economy, but as 
more and more individuals begin to make such bets, the risks involved can present real 
dangers to the solvency of the exposed financial institutions.  Such exposure and the 
intricate interconnectedness of today’s mega-financial institutions present a real threat to 
the system as a whole during panics.  A ‘Minsky moment’ can destroy the functionality 
of financial markets and render leveraged borrowers and financial institutions insolvent 
overnight.  The intertwining nature of today’s financial system means that such failures 
on the part of an individual institution can very easily cause dangerous repercussions 
across the entire system and economy.                                                         23 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (McGraw Hill, New York: 2008), originally 
published Princeton University Press: 1986, p. 244. 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Thus it would behoove financial regulators to make a regular and thorough examination 
of risk appetite in financial markets.  Such data could be taken to indicate whether an 
exuberance on the part of market participants is rational or irrational—i.e. whether or not 
increases in asset prices indicate the formation of a potentially harmful bubble.  If it were 
determined that the cause of such a buildup might be speculative in nature, the 
appropriate regulatory authorities might take steps designed to prevent the inflation of the 
bubble.  If bubbles could be stopped before they were fully formed in this manner, 
dangerous crashes, widespread financial panics and accompanying recessionary periods 
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